Can official news and policy announcements affect foreign exchange speculation? This paper investigates the impact of macroeconomic surprises on risk perceptions of carry traders and the size of their overall positions. Unlike much of the previous literature, we are able to identify a significant impact of macroeconomic surprises on foreign exchange volatility of JPY/USD even at low (daily) frequency. We use information gleaned from risk reversal contracts (tails of the implied returns distribution) during the period when concerns about sharp yen appreciation were particularly high, hence more likely to show up in the price of risk. We also consider a broader set of U.S. and Japanese news than previous work, focusing on the announcements with particularly large surprise components to them. Overall, we find that macroeconomic news is an important determinant of risk reversals during periods of heavy carry trade volume, particularly when the cost of hedging against large yen appreciation is increasing. The results are more supportive of the trade-balance flow channel over portfolio-balance or monetary channel of exchange rate determination during the sample period. Specifically, Japan (U.S.) macro news that worsen (improve) the trade balance generally are associated with less perceived risk of sharp yen appreciation, as reflected in the value of risk reversals. Moreover, there is a close link between risk reversals and non-commercial futures positions. We calculate a substantial effect of macroeconomic news on carry trade activity, with risk reversals (the cost of hedging) as the transmission mechanism.
Introduction
One of the consequences of the zero-interest rate policy in Japan was the emergence of massive yen currency carry trade activity where investors borrowed in yen (funding currency) and bought higher-yield assets in other currencies (target or investment currency). Specifically, carry trade is a foreign exchange arbitrage strategy in which an investor borrows in a low interest rate currency and takes a long position in a higher interest rate currency betting that the exchange rate will not change so as to offset the profits made on the yield differential. For example, an investor can fund higher yielding deposits in the U.S. by borrowing from commercial banks in Japan at low interest. This strategy will necessitate a foreign exchange transaction to sell yen for U.S. dollars in order to convert yen liabilities into dollar assets. In addition to issuing liabilities in low-interest currencies, carry trade can be conducted using currency forwards and futures on the margin (Gagnon and Chaboud 2007) . For example, a hedge fund could enter a forward contract to sell yen for dollar at some future date. Such carry trade strategies generated persistent excess returns (e.g. Burnside et al., 2007; Darvas, 2009; Hichradl and Wagner, 2010) , but also exposed carry traders to substantial currency risk and large losses if the yen were to appreciate substantially (Gyntelberg and Remolona, 2007) . Figure 1 shows the U.S.-Japan interest differential and the JPY/USD exchange rate during 2004-06 when the yen carry trade was at its height. The prolonged low interest policy and weak economy in Japan, during which short-term money market rates were continuously near zero, combined with a strong economy and rising interest rates in the U.S., led to a rising, large and persistent interest differential. The figure also shows that the JPY/USD depreciated on average over this period, but that trend depreciation was interrupted by several episodes of sharp appreciation and considerable volatility. This seeming violation of uncovered interest parity (UIP) 1, 2 allowed profit opportunities (ex post) for carry traders, but the riskiness of this strategy was also exposed during the bouts of large yen appreciation.
One way to hedge against the risk of substantial yen appreciation is to enter into a risk reversal contract. A risk reversal contract is the simultaneous purchase of a deep out-of-money 1 An appreciation of the high yield currency is an example of the forward premium puzzle and the violation of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) well documented by Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Engel (1996) . 2 Ichiue and Koyama (2011) estimate the UIP regression coefficient as low as -2.79 for the yen.
(OTM) call option and the sale of a deep OTM put option 3 . The holder of the risk reversal is hedging against sharp yen appreciation and accepting (unlikely) downside risk of sharp yen depreciation, taking on a one-sided bet. If yen (funding currency) appreciates sharply, the payoff is positive for the risk reversal. The opposite is true for sharp yen depreciation. Carry traders would lose on this risk reversal contract if the yen depreciates sharply, but this loss is more than offset by gains from holding an open yen carry-trade position. As such, the value of risk reversals are frequently treated as a proxy of expectations about the risk of very large changes in exchange rates 4 . During the "carry trade" period in Japan, when financial institutions were borrowing heavily in yen and investing in assets denominated in U.S. dollar and other currencies, the value of the risk reversal was always negative. This indicates a market hedge against sharp appreciation of the JPY/USD exchange rate.
This paper investigates market perceptions of the risk of large exchange rate movements by using information gleaned from risk reversal contracts and macroeconomic news surprises. 5 We focus on the height of the carry trade period in Japan (March 2004 through December 2006 , where the sample is delimited at the beginning by the cessation of the Bank of Japan large-scale intervention operations and ends before the financial crisis emerged. Our view is that concerns about sharp yen appreciation were particularly evident during the period of heavy carry trade activity and are more likely to show up in the price of risk.
We are interested in which macro news announcements appear to influence the risk assessments of traders involved in the yen carry trade. Does macroeconomic news explain the hedging behavior of foreign exchange traders and is this important for the carry trade? To investigate this question we focus on "big" news surprises (greater than one standard deviation movements) that are more likely to convey information about the risk of large changes in the exchange rate. To our knowledge, we are the only study that investigates the direct impact of news (other than foreign exchange market intervention) for the value of JPY/USD risk reversals.
3 A risk reversal is a directional bet on (or hedge against) a large price movement constructed by a simultaneous purchase of out-of-money call and sale of out-of-money put option (usually 25 or 10 delta) of the same maturity. The value itself is the implied volatility for the call minus the implied volatility of the put. 4 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) interpret such persistent UIP violations as a compensation to carry traders for the downside risk of sharp funding currency appreciation. 5 Evans and Lyons (2008) investigate the impact of macro news on order flow, while Ito and Hashimoto (2010) and Fatum, Hutchison, and Wu (2010) investigate high frequency responses to macro surprises in JPY/USD exchange rate. Galati et al. (2006) and Disyatat and Galati (2007) consider the impact of official foreign exchange market intervention on risk reversals in the JPY/USD market and Czech Koruna -Euro market, respectively.
In our investigation we consider a broad set of news-thirty three sources (18 U.S. series and 15 Japan series) -the choice of which is guided both by theory and previous empirical work in related areas. A critical issue in the yen carry is the particular concern over large yen appreciation, so we explicitly consider the asymmetric impact of news possibly stemming from loss aversion when the cost of hedging yen appreciation is increasing. Finally, we consider the indirect effect of news through the value of risk reversals on the yen carry trade, using (noncommercial) open interest positions in future markets as a proxy for carry trade activity. The investigation of the link between macroeconomic news and futures positions through the riskreversals channels may provide an explanation base on carry trade activity to the finding by Chen and Gau (2010) in that the contribution of futures prices to overall price discovery in foreign exchange markets increases markedly around the times of macroeconomic announcements.
Unlike much of the previous literature, we are able to identify a significant impact of macroeconomic surprises on foreign exchange volatility of JPY/USD even at low (daily) frequency. We use information gleaned from risk reversal contracts (tails of the implied returns distribution) during the period when concerns about sharp yen appreciation were particularly high, hence more likely to show up in the price of risk. Overall, we find that macroeconomic news is an important determinant of risk reversals during periods of heavy carry trade volume, particularly when the cost of hedging against large yen appreciation is increasing. Estimates using predicted values based regression coefficients show that the cumulative impact of macroeconomic surprises can account for more than a third of the total change in risk reversals during particularly dramatic episodes of changing risk perceptions in the JPY/USD market.
Moreover, there is a close link between risk reversals and NCMS positions (a proxy for carry trade activity), and this link is borne out in Granger causality tests. Using this metric, we are able to calculate the effect of macroeconomic news on carry trade activity, with risk reversals (the cost of hedging) as the transmission mechanism. Depending on the subsample and calculation method macroeconomic news surprises can translate into more than one third of the total adjustment in yen speculative positions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and institutional features of the carry trade and market for risk reversals. Section 3 presents the main empirical analysis and results. This section establishes a link between macroeconomic surprises and the value of risk reversals which is robust to a number of empirical model specifications. We consider a large variety of news types and, given that risk reversals price the probability of extreme exchange rate fluctuations, we identify large surprises. Section 4 investigates the link between risk reversals and carry-trade activity where, as a proxy for the latter, we use open interest non-commercial short futures positions (NCMS) in yen on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (NCMS increased from 40,000 to over 160,000 during our sample period). By examining the correlations and through Granger-causality tests we establish a robust link between risk reversals and net NCMS
showing that the short positions in yen decline (rise) following an increase (decrease) in the cost of insurance against a substantial yen appreciation. The empirical link between non-commercial futures and risk-reversals may help explain the recent finding by Chen and Gau (2010) that the share of the contribution to the price discovery in the JPY/USD markets of futures rates rises relative to spot rates during the times surrounding the macroeconomic announcements. The Granger-causal relationship between risk reversals and NCMS allows us to obtain an estimate of the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on the risk-sensitive carry trade activity.
1. Data and Risk Reversals
Institutional Features
A risk reversal is a directional bet (or hedge) against large price swings. It is a contract long one unit out-of-the-money (OTM) (typically 25-delta 6 ) FX call option and short one unit OTM FX put option. In other words it is the cost of buying insurance against large foreign currency appreciation, financed by providing insurance against large foreign currency depreciation. The value of a risk reversal is equal to the implied volatility of an out-of-money call minus the implied volatility of an out-of-money put of the same moneyness and maturity. Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) applied the original Black and Scholes (1973) framework to foreign exchange options. We following Galati and Humpage (2006) with the following representation of a price of a European foreign exchange call option:
where,
X is the strike price, F=e
S represent the forward rate, i and i* are domestic and foreign interest rates, S is the spot exchange rate and Φ is the cumulative distribution of a standard
normal. An option's delta represent is sensitivity to the changes in the exercise price. Risk reversals are constructed from out-of-money options with only 25% sensitivity to changes in the strike price. Then the call price has the following property:
Finally, a 25-delta risk reversal is the difference in the implied volatility of a 25-delta call and put option: 
Under a symmetric risk-neutral distribution the value of risk reversal should be zero since both OTM call and put will have the same probability of landing at-the-money by the expiration date. Therefore, risk reversals only take on non-zero values if the risk-neutral distribution of foreign exchange returns is skewed, their value conveying the combined effect of expected skewness and skewness risk premium. Negative values of risk reversals imply that out-of-money dollar puts have a higher probability of being exercised than out-of-money dollar calls indicating a market hedge against large yen appreciation (U.S. dollar depreciation).
Jain and Stafford (2006) Unlike the implied skewness of at-the-money options, risk reversals provide potentially useful information on market pricing of extremely large events 7 . Farhi and Gabaix (2008) formulate a general equilibrium model in which they show that under certain conditions risk reversals depict the difference in the resilience of the two country's export sector productivities to aggregate shocks.
We are aware of two studies that have investigated the empirical links between risk reversals 8 and official foreign exchange market intervention, using macroeconomic news in one case as control variables. Galati et al. (2006) estimate the effect of Japanese foreign exchange market intervention on the value of JPY/USD risk reversals along with other measures of dispersion in exchange rate expectations. 9 They consider daily data over January 1996 -November 2005 and find weak evidence that intervention operations impact risk reversals. Disyatat and Galati (2007) study the impact of official intervention on the value of risk reversals in the Czech KorunaEuro, using daily data over September 2001 to September 2002. They also find that intervention has a limited impact on risk reversals, but that macroeconomic news is not significant. (They consider several measures of price, output and unemployment surprises for the Czech Republic and Germany).
7 Risk reversals are also used indirectly along with other option derivatives to derive higher moments of risk neutral distributions. Galati et al. (2005) and Morel and Teiletche (2008) study the relationship between official interventions in foreign exchange and market uncertainty. They use FX strangle and risk reversal prices to recover option implied higher moments of the risk-neutral FX return distribution. 8 Several related studies including Beber and Brandt (2006) , and Aijo (2008) investigate the impact of macroeconomic surprises on options implied higher moments, including option implied skewness, while Lahaye et al. (2010) study the effects macro announcements on jump components in realized volatility. 9 Galati et al. (2005) consider the effect of intervention and macroeconomic news on several measures of expectations regarding exchange rate movements, one of which (skewness) is derived from the value of risk reversals.
Data
We obtain daily data on 1-month and 1-year 25-delta risk reversals from Bloomberg. We confine our sample to the tranquil period of active carry trade after the last episode Japanese In terms of macroeconomic news, we seek to identify variables that may influence the risk perceptions of carry traders regarding the likelihood of large exchange rate movements (as gleaned from risk reversal contracts). Although there are various theoretical exchange rate models linking macro news surprises to exchange rate movements, there is no consensus in the literature over which drivers are most important in theory or empirical analysis. Two broad exchange rate theoretical paradigms may be identified-(1) flow models that emphasize the impact of various economic drivers on the trade balance and thereby the exchange rate and (2) stock models that emphasize the impact of various economic drivers on asset prices and thereby the exchange rate (e.g. portfolio balance models and monetary models of exchange rate determination). The academic profession generally prefers the asset-market approach to exchange rate determination, while practitioners frequently refer to the trade balance/exchange rate nexus as important in practice. Moreover, many economic drivers may enter in either theoretical paradigm but frequently with different directions of causal influence. For example, strong GDP growth may be an indicator of stronger money demand and lead to a currency appreciation in the asset model, or an indicator of worsening trade balance and currency depreciation in the flow model.
Unfortunately, the empirical literature is not able to fully distinguish which model explains exchange rate movements best in practice. We therefore cast the net widely and include in our set of explanatory variables an array of macro news, guided partly by those having demonstrated significant explanatory power in related empirical work and partly by data availability. As discussed in the next section, it turns out that our results-in terms of the signs of the coefficients--are most easily economically interpreted in the context of a trade-balance flow model of exchange rate determination, i.e. factors that tend to improve the Japanese (U.S.) trade balance appear to decrease the value of risk reversals, implying a rise in the expected likelihood of large yen (USD) appreciation.
We begin by choosing Japanese news variables that are comparable to U.S. news variables found to be statistically in the Andersen et al. (2003) investigation of exchange rates and other asset prices. 10 The inclusion of most of these variables may be justified by both the flow and asset models of exchange rates. We also consider several uniquely Japanese news items that are considered to be particularly important as indictors for the strength of Japan's economy, e.g. surprises regarding the Bank of Japan's TANKAN survey variables. 
Empirical Results: Macro News and Risk Reversals

Preliminaries
The upper panel of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 1-month and 1-year risk reversal series in levels and in first differences. The maximum and minimum are (-0.05, -2.45) and (-0.725, -2.75) for 1-month and 1-year risk reversals respectively indicating that both series have remained negative throughout the sample period consistent with market hedge against sharp yen appreciation.
12 A standardized news surprise is given by the unexpected component of the macroeconomic announcement divided by the associated sample standard deviation. Let t q A , denote the value of a given macroeconomic fundamental q, announced at time (minute) t. Let t q E , refer to the median value of the preceding market expectations for the given fundamental at announcement time t, and let q σˆ denote the sample standard deviation of all the surprise components associated with fundamental q. The standardized surprise of macroeconomic fundamental q announced at time t is then defined as
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Peron unit root tests are shown in the lower panel of Table 1 . These tests indicate that the log levels were not stationary. The null hypothesis is that there exists a unit root. The first column shows the unit root test on the value of a one-year 25 delta risk reversal. The second column is the corresponding tests on first differences of the values. Both tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels, but reject the null in first differences by a large margin (greater than 99% level of confidence). We therefore proceed to estimate our empirical model with the dependent variable in first difference form.
Estimation Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the results. We focus in our formal empirical analysis on one-year risk reversals, the longer maturity options, in order to capture the hedging horizons of carry traders 13 . Table 2 shows the baseline results where the regressions are estimated using OLS and all the macroeconomic surprises are included in the data set, i.e. we do not drop "small" surprises from the sample. Table 3 focuses on whether "large" changes affect the value of risk reversals, as would be expected since risk reversals reflect the risk of very large exchange rate changes. We use two criteria to select "large" surprises. The first approach is to consider only surprises outside "narrow bounds," i.e. exclude all surprises less than one standard deviation from the series specific mean value. The standard deviation is calculated based on all observations of the surprise variables, including days with no surprises. The second approach, which denote as "wide bounds," is a stricter criteria whereby the standard deviation is calculated on non-zero observations only, thus effectively making the exclusion bounds wider. The results reported in the two tables are similar and most of the discussion will focus on our preferred equation reported in Table 3 . Only the significant coefficients are reported for brevity. Complete regression results are reported in the appendix tables.
The two panels of The value of including the exchange rate and interest rate differential is evident from the estimates in Table 2 , so we include these variables in Table 3 where we focus on "large" news surprises. The left-hand-side panel is estimated using OLS and the right-hand-side is estimated using an ARMA(4,4) process, for both "large" surprise selection criteria. In particular, closer analysis of the errors of the initial estimation suggested both AR(4) and MA(4) terms were appropriate-based on a significant lag in the autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function, respectively-in the estimation. This model was chosen, relative to a simple OLS estimation, given the Akaike information criteria.
14 The right-hand-side panel of Table 3 shows that the same explanatory variables remain significant (U.S. GDP and Consumer Credit and Japan's Trade Balance, Consumer Confidence and Overall Household Spending) when only "large" surprises are considered. In addition, U.S.
Personal Income and Japan's TANKAN Non-Manufacturing Index are highly significant under the "wide bounds" selection criteria. In all, three U.S. macro news surprises and four Japanese macro news surprises have a statistically significant impact on the value of risk reversals during our sample period.
The standardization of the macro news surprises allows a comparison of the relative sizes of the coefficients. Consumer Credit has the highest coefficient in absolute value among U.S.
surprises at -7.0 compared to -3.9 for U.S. GDP and 1.2 for Personal Income. Among the Japanese macro surprises Trade Balance has the highest coefficient in absolute value of -6.4
followed by Overall Household Spending with 4.8.
Conditional Regressions
Next we examine the possibility that surprise macroeconomic announcements may have an asymmetric impact on risk reversals during periods of increasing risk of a large yen appreciation compared to periods of decreasing risk of a large yen appreciation. We construct an increasingrisk-dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 on day when risk reversals rise in absolute value and a value of 0 otherwise. Then we repeat the regression of LARGE macroeconomic surprise announcements using the ARMA (4, 4) specification interacting each news surprise with the lagged rising-risk dummy. Table 4 shows the results for both "narrow bounds" and "wide bounds" regressions. An estimate is missing (indicated with "-") if no LARGE surprise announcement for a particular news type was preceded by an increase in the absolute value of risk reversals during our sample period.
The regression results in Table 4 indicate that the set of significant macroeconomic surprises, when an announcement is preceded with an increase in the cost of hedging yen appreciation risk,
is not the same as the unconditional specification. Moreover, under the stricter "wide bounds"
selection criteria for LARGE surprises, more types of macroeconomic news surprises have a statistically significant impact on risk reversals. The difference is especially stark for news emanating from the U.S. Both conditional regressions exhibit higher R-squared, Durbin-Watson, and Akaike information criterion than unconditional regressions reported in Table 2 and Table 3 indicating that most of the explanatory power of macroeconomic news surprises is higher during periods of increasing risk aversion.
Focusing on the "narrow bounds" regression (left panel of Household Spending remains positive and significant as was also the case in the unconditional regressions.
Next we focus on the "wide bounds" regression (right panel of Table 4 Table 5 shows the results for the two subsamples. The first two columns show the cumulative impact from surprise macro announcements for the first subsample, using both the "narrow band" for upper bound and the "wide band" for the lower bound regressions from Table 3 . The cumulative impact of macroeconomic surprises ranges from 0.32 to 0.37, accounting for 25-30% of the total change in the value of risk reversals over this episode. In particular, the net negative GDP and consumer credit news in the U.S., combined with negative trade balance news in Japan, led to a sharp reduction in the perceived risk of large yen appreciation. Recall that the R 2 in the baseline regression not controlling for exchange rate or interest rate was approximately 0.03
indicating that over the entire sample period surprise macro announcements explain approximately 3% of the variation in the value of risk reversals. However, focusing on a subsample of dramatic decline in the market value of risk we see that macro surprise announcements can account for over 30% of the cumulative change in the value of risk reversals.
The third and fourth columns of Exchange (CME), which is the largest exchange for foreign exchange futures by volume 16 .
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) usually releases its Commitments of
Traders report (COT) on Fridays after the bell, but it reflects the position at the close of previous business Tuesday. CFTC classifies traders as non-commercial if they have no foreign exchange exposure to hedge and therefore presumably trade to make profit 17 . These traders on average 15 For instance Hattori and Shin (2009) argue that carry trade can be accomplished through inter-office loans of multinational investment banks. 16 also examine the currency denominations of international assets and liabilities of commercial banks available to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Focusing on Japan, Gagnon and Chaboud (2007) trace the balance sheets of not only the banking sector, but also Japan's official sector and private non-banking sector. While CME non-commercial futures can only serve as a proxy for the broader yen carry trade, Cecchetti et al. (2010) show that this metric shows close association to a novel BIS measure of carry trade activity based on the BIS banking statistics, foreign exchange swap data, and stock of yen-denominated international bonds. As a way to check the consistency of CME noncommercial short positions in yen with the broader carry trade Figure 3 plots the time series of non-commercial short positions and a simple rate of return to carry trade (following Hochradl and Wagner (2010)):
where ik,t denote the effective k-period deposit rates available in Japan and U.S. at a given Tuesday of the same week, t. We use 1-month deposit rates. This trend is consistent with the expected behavior of carry traders increasingly going short Yen and long USD during the period of rising ex-ante returns to carry trade. (CFTC Form 40). The CFTC staff may re-classify the trader if they possess additional information about the trader's use of the futures market. Furthermore, each trader receives a separate classification for each commodity depending on the traders' use of each market. In 2009 the CFTC began published the Disaggregated COT with more detailed trader classifications. Its own historical comparison between the two reports finds that historically the "noncommercial" category included professional money managers (such as hedge funds and commodity trading advisers) and other "speculative" traders while the "commercial" category has included producers, merchants, processors, and swap dealers who use futures markets to offset risks incurred in over-the-counter markets. For further details see http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/. A simple "back of the envelope" calculation measuring the impact of macroeconomic surprises emanating from U.S. and Japan on carry trade activity transmitted during the two episodes of wide swings in risk reversals (a reduction in perceived risk and a rise in perceived risk) discussed in the previous section is informative. As Figure 4 shows, the first episode The cumulative impact of news surprises on risk reversals is multiplied by the sum of the coefficients on ∆RR t-j in the Granger-causality equation (7) in Table 6 . Table 7 shows the results.
The first column of each panel corresponds to the conservative estimate obtained by multiplying the cumulative impact of macro surprises in excess of "wide bands" by the coefficient on ∆RR t-j in the specification of (7) with 1-lag. The second column yields a higher estimate by multiplying the cumulative impact of macro surprises in excess of "narrow bands" by the sum of the coefficients in the 2-lag Granger causality specification in equation (7). We focus on "big" news surprises (greater than one standard deviation movements) that are more likely to convey information about the risk of large changes in the exchange rate, and consider a broad set of news-thirty three sources (18 U.S. series and 15 Japan series) --and the investigate the direct impact of news other than intervention for the value of JPY/USD yen risk reversals. We also consider the effect of the value of risk reversals on the yen carry trade, using (non-commercial) open interest positions in future markets as a proxy for carry trade activity.
Overall, we find that macroeconomic news is an important determinant of risk reversals during periods of heavy carry trade volume. The results are most intuitively interpreted in the context of joint trade balance/exchange rate model. Macro news from the U.S. that increases the size of the U.S. trade deficit (e.g. high GDP growth and U.S. consumer credit) generally reduce the value of risk reversals, and increase the perceived risk of sharp dollar depreciation against the yen. Symmetrically, news of an improvement in the Japanese trade balance reduces the value of risk reversals and increases the perceived likelihood of sharp yen appreciation, while factors that lead to a worsening Japanese trade balance (e.g. rising Japanese Consumer Confidence Index and Overall Household Spending) increase the value of risk reversals, indicating less risk of major yen appreciation
In addition, we find that is a close link between risk reversals and net non-commercial futures positions (a proxy for carry trade activity), and this link is borne out in Granger causality tests.
Using this metric, we are able to calculate the effect of macroeconomic news on carry trade activity, with risk reversals (the cost of hedging) as the transmission mechanism. Depending on the subsample and calculation method, macroeconomic news surprises can translate into more than one third of the total adjustment in yen speculative positions. observations. Standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate coefficients significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Constant and day of the week omitted because of insignificant coefficient. Only coefficient on significant macroeconomic surprise announcements reported, for complete regression results see Table A1 in the appendix. Note: An appreciation of the high yield currency is an example of the forward premium puzzle and the violation of the uncovered interest parity (UIP). The UIP regression coefficient has been estimated as low as -2.79 for the yen (Ichiue and Koyama , 2011) . Appendix: complete coefficient vector -impact of macroeconomic surprises on risk reversals 
